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Abstract 
This paper is a philosophical response to some critical 
incidents in a first year philosophy of education course at 
the Wits School of Education where I used to work. It is 
an invitation to explore the different philosophies 
lecturers bring to their pedagogical practice as a means 
to address, at a theoretical level, the conditions that 
make transformation possible. I will argue that the 
kinaesthetic activities that I have incorporated in my 
teaching and that I actively promote with student 
teachers and teachers can be regarded at one level as 
“childish games suitable for 4 and 5 year olds”, or at 
another level, as an acknowledgment of the bodily roots 
of thinking and all human intellect. The space we inhabit 
is that of an epistemological orphanage: there are no 
Fathers to turn to. The aim of the paper is to show how 
the cooked spaghetti metaphor makes it possible to 
justify an embodied relational pedagogy and to conclude 
that transformation at a deep level is made possible only 
when we allow ‘child’ to play and we acknowledge the 
pedagogical implications of reason’s ‘contamination’ by 
the particular, the anecdotal, the contextual and the 
emotions. Thinkers do not ‘have’ bodies, but ‘are’ bodies, 
and this perspective influences pedagogical decisions, 
making learning more inclusive and meaningful, 
especially for students from more ‘underprivileged’ 
backgrounds.  
Key words: knowledge, epistemology, spaghetti, tangle, 
dualism(s), non-dualist, modernism, postmodernism, 
becoming, materiality of ideas, ontological insecurity, 
inner space, territoriality, community of language-users, 
linguistic turn, nomadic subject, embodied knower, 
hermeneutics, vulnerability, text, inter-connectedness, 
dialogue, meaning-making, concept, conceptions, agency, 
otherisation, essentialisation, embodied relational 
pedagogy, epistemological orphan, inclusive education. 
Disadvantage, transformation, apartheid, South Africa, 
teacher education.  
A critical incident 
Critical incidents in practice are created
1
. They do not exist 
independent of an observer, but are produced by the way 
we interpret a situation. Some of the events in my first 
year of teaching at the University of the Witwatersrand 
(Wits) in Johannesburg took me by surprise – they struck 
me deeply. It was often my emotions that alerted me to 
the fact that, for example, my responses to an email 
exchange, a gesture, and expressions of passive resistance 
involved evaluative judgments (Nussbaum 1990, 2001, 
2004). They lead to an increased sensitivity of my own 
moral values and to a re-examination of my implicit 
epistemological beliefs and ideas. Some of these incidents 
I have welcomed as they have helped me shape a deeper 
understanding of my own pedagogical, moral and political 
commitments to my students. Without open and explicit 
dissensus and conflict amongst colleagues there is little 
freedom within academia to explore existing paradigms 
and dominant discourses.  
 
For the sake of clarity I will focus on one particular incident 
only. Typically, at Wits School of Education a weekly 
lecture is followed by two small group tutorials under the 
auspices of a team of tutors. With about 800 mainly black 
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 As explained elsewhere in more detail: Haynes & Murris 
(forthcoming b). 




students, whose command of English is often poor
2
, I 
judged that creating opportunities in the tutorials for 
inclusive interactive teaching strategies was imperative, in 
particular to provoke the kind of interaction that would 
‘mix up’ their usual ‘automatic’ groupings according to 
race or ethnicity. In the course outline I describe it as 
follows:  
 
In the tutorials we will be focusing on turning 
statements and first-order questions into 
second-order (more philosophical) questions. 
Our gained knowledge and understanding will be 
put to the test in the second tut. Firstly by taking 
some questions of the first tut and spotting the 
assumptions, and secondly with the help of a 
series of questions from your portfolio which we 
will try and answer in constantly changing pairs 
(Mad Hatter’s Tea Party). 
 
The Mad Hatter’s Tea Party is a kinaesthetic intervention
3
 
that involves rearranging the furniture in such a way that 
students sit on chairs (without desks) in two lines ‘knees to 
knees’. Some teachers are more familiar with the name 
                                                          
2
 Moreover, in 2009 we had an additional group of 229 
students from the Limpopo province. They are 
experienced, mostly middle-aged, female Foundation 
phase teachers. Sponsored by the provincial government 
they are completing a 4 year BEd degree in an effort to 
upgrade their initial training. They are residential and only 
return home in the holidays. They have taught mainly in 
sePedi (one of the eleven official South African languages), 
speak mainly sePedi to each other and after having 
received their higher education instruction through the 
medium of English will return to their sePedi speaking 
schools. It is fair to say that apart from the university 
classroom most have little systematic exposure to 
speaking and writing in English. 
3
 See: www.reviewing.com for more of Roger Greenaway’s 
reviewing strategies. I have also collected a range of 
kinaesthetic interventions in an unpublished document 
called Thinking Moves which was given to the students 
and to the tutors with instructions for classroom 
implementation. (This document you can download from 
www.karinmurris.com). 
‘speed dating’ for this activity. Then a task is set, which is 
carried out with the person opposite for a few minutes (as 
in this case answering the questions they formulated 
themselves on a flipchart). Then after a signal from the 
teacher, all stand up and move one chair to the left 
(clockwise). The movement constitutes new partners to 
work with and so on, until the task is completed or time 
has run out. As long as the task is relevant and links in with 
students’ interest, this inclusive strategy is very effective, 
judging from students’ engaged bodies as well as the 
outcomes of the pair discussions. However, despite 
modelling this intervention in our weekly tutors’ meeting it 
became apparent after the tutorial that the majority of 
tutors with a philosophy background had refused to follow 
my instructions with their tutorial group. For them 
philosophy consists of critical engagement with academic 
texts, not as one philosopher of education put it: playing 
“childish games suitable for 4 and 5 year olds”. He judged 
such activities to be demeaning – that we should not treat 
our students as if they were young children. I was 
unexpectedly made accountable for my pedagogical 
choices and was struck in particular by his assumptions 
about the concept ‘child’.  
The spaghetti metaphor 
The challenge I faced was how to structure my response, 
as my pedagogical practice is an expression of what 
Deleuze and Guattari call the ‘rhizome’, that is, a 
construction of knowledge as non-hierarchical, without a 
root, trunk and branches (the tree metaphor of 
knowledge), but as something that “shoots in all directions 
with no beginning and end, but always in between, and 
with openings toward other directions and places” 
(Dahlberg 2003, p. 280). How we construe knowledge and 
the metaphors we live by and think with, shape our 
pedagogical practices. The idea of knowledge as a “tangle 
of spagetti” (Malguzzi quoted in Dahlberg 2003, p. 279) 




profoundly challenges habits of thought about 
development, progression and the organisation and 
planning of lessons. Strings of spaghetti have ends that are 
both: endings and beginnings. With cooked spaghetti it is 
often not clear where one string starts and one ends – 
closely touching and sticking. All strings are of the same 
shape and size; they are equal. Moreover, in this case the 
strings are not confined to a bowl. There are no 
boundaries, there is no map of the territory. The tangle of 
strings is infinite.  For Levinas, the idea of infinity “disrupts 
and dislocates human subjectivity” (Dahlberg 2003, p. 272) 
in that our knowledge of the Other is always limited and 
fallible. The metaphor makes it possible to regard 
students’ prior knowledge as a gift to extend our own 
knowledge and understanding as educators, rather than 
treating personal, private knowledge as a necessary 
starting point to lead the student down a well-trodden and 
pre-determined path. As educators, we make a 
philosophical choice between construing the primary aims 
of education as socialisation into an existing order, or 
whether the acquisition of knowledge and skills also 
includes strengthening resilience and imagination 
necessary to construe an order that is non-existing (as 
yet), but desirable. I will return to this in the context of 
transformation below. 
The metaphor of spaghetti opens up possibilities of 
pedagogical encounters that challenge the familiar 
constructions of teaching as mediation or “scaffolding” 
(Wood, Bruner & Ross 1976), whereby the teacher is 
construed as the knowledge expert who helps the less 
knowledgeable learner to move one step at a time (like 
climbing the stairs to ‘enlightenment’) from the ‘unknown’ 
to the ‘known’ (adult) knowledge. Such practice implies 
that the teacher asks the questions in class and is regarded 
as the authority of what counts as valuable knowledge. 
The adult is supposed to be always one step ‘ahead’. In 
this paper I put forward an alternative conception 
whereby teachers make room for learners’ questions and 
prior knowledge and experiences, thereby opening up 
possibilities to think differently about what knowledge is, 
and who owns and constructs new knowledges. In this 
kind of scaffolding the building materials are not made of 
steel or iron, but of narrative, a use of the body, 
imagination and fantasy
4
. The shape of the construction is 
not necessarily square or rectangular, but undetermined. 
Everyone in class helps to construct the scaffolding and 
plays on it – taking risks, encountering dangers, ignoring 
the warning signs, not wearing a crash helmet
5
. Such an 
alternative epistemological relationship between teacher 
and learner has moral and political implications. I will 
argue how it involves moving away from the currently 
dominant psychological and modernist construction of the 
individual subject – the teacher – still prevalent in (higher) 
education.  
Now, why is the spaghetti metaphor so illuminating for 
understanding and justifying my own teaching practices, 
particularly in post-Apartheid South Africa? Firstly, I will 
take a closer look at the role of metaphors in teaching and 
learning (one bit of spaghetti). Secondly, I will explore the 
situated deep dualisms in education and their modernist 
roots (a bit of spaghetti closely intertwined with the 
previous). Thirdly, I will explore some non-dualist 
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 For a theoretical argumentation of this pedagogy see: 
Haynes, J & K. Murris. (2012) Picturebooks, Pedagogy and 
Philosophy. New York: Routledge (Research in Education 
Series). For practical guidance, see: Murris, K. & Haynes J. 
(2002) Storywise: Thinking through Stories; international e-
book version. Johannesburg: Infonet Publications; 
www.infonet-publications.com, or for the 2010 
international e-book version: Johannesburg: Infonet 
Publications; www.infonet-publications.com. 
5
 It is thanks to private email conversations with Associate 
Prof Joanna Haynes from the University of Plymouth, UK, 
that the scaffolding metaphor unfolds in this manner in 
the paper.   




responses and draw the implications for the teaching of 
thinking and the use of academic texts. I will finish by 
exploring the distinction between ‘childlike’ and ‘childish’ 
in the context of transformation and return to the critical 
incident in the university staff room. 
Being an epistemological orphan 
Italian feminist philosopher Rosi Braidotti calls all modern 
wo/men “epistemological orphans” (Braidotti 1991, p. 2) 
and puts forward the alternative of the ‘nomadic’ subject 
as an invitation to speak about the bodily roots of the 
thinking process (Braidotti 1991, p. 8). The nomadic 
subject is continuously ‘becoming’ – a corporeal entity 
that has spatio-temporal force – that is, embedded and 
embodied, and therefore immanent and dynamic 
(Braidotti 2006 pp. 151-2). Her critique of liberal 
individualism and instrumental rationality has implications 
for any theoretical work in philosophy, which she calls a 
“building site” and that involves “…selection of elements, 
the distribution of tasks, and the overall plan for the 
project are the key to what is called the ‘materiality’ of 
ideas” (Braidotti 1991, p. 2). The craftsmanship involved is 
not that of building scaffolds with pre-determined 
structures: the material and the shape are unpredictable, 
infinite and relational. Our unavoidable historical 
condition, she claims, is to suffer “ontological insecurity” 
and a loss of paternal authority (Braidotti 1991, p. 2). 
Philosophy can no longer be seen as a rational activity of 
system building, but “a thinking through the body” and  
“working with ideas which are programmes for action 
rather than dogmatic blocks” (Braidotti 1991 p. 3; p. 8). 
Although philosophy may not involve building a system 
with secure ‘foundations’, there is a structure 
nevertheless. In order to appreciate the implications of the 
‘nomadic’ subject for teaching and learning, and how this 
connects with the Mad Hatters Tea Party activity, I need to 
make a few historical links.  
There is much talk about postmodernism, but not as much 
in educational circles about the epistemological roots of 
‘modernism’ and what postmodernism is a response to. I 
will start by outlining some core distinctions in Western 
epistemology, and argue how these have been 
problematised in contemporary philosophy. The main 
thrust of my argument is about the relationship between 
language and reality, knowledge and understanding and 
the educational implications of what it means to be an 
‘epistemological orphan’. 
Western epistemology since Ancient Greece has focused 
on answering the central question: How can the knowing 
subject have certain knowledge of a world (the object) that 
is in constant flux, therefore is always unreliable and 
deceptive? (Famously, Greek philosopher Heraclitus 
claimed that we can never step in the same river twice.) 
Over the centuries, philosophers have developed various 
answers to this core question. The need to bridge the ‘gap’ 
between the subject and the object and the attempt by 
philosophers to secure the foundations of true knowledge 
has resulted in commonly held beliefs about truth 
(correspondence between subject and object), knowledge 
as infallible, ever-expanding and transmittable, and the 
belief that a progressive movement to intellectual 
perfection requires control over the body and mastery 
over the emotions.  
Why is this so? The subject/object distinction found an 
influential re-interpretation (since Plato) in the works of 
French philosopher René Descartes – the Father of 
modernity. He lived in the seventeenth century and settled 
the notion of the mind (the subject) – as a separate entity, 
located in ‘inner space’ – firmly in Western philosophical 
tradition, that is, the mind as a substance in which mental 
processes occur. To quote one of Descartes’ most famous 
passages: 




I am a thinking thing, or a substance whose whole 
essence or nature consists in thinking. And 
although...I have a body to which I am very closely 
united, nevertheless... it is certain that I, that is to 
say, my mind, by which I am what I am, is entirely 
and truly distinct from my body, and may exist 
without it (Descartes 1968, p. 156). 
Descartes had borrowed the notion of ‘substance’ from 
Aristotle, as one of the categories with which we structure 
reality. Anything that has independent existence, or can 
‘stand on its own’, such as stones, chairs and trees are a 
substance, as opposed to skills, emotions or colours. 
Problems arise of course when we want to categorise very 
small objects, such as molecules or atoms, or very large 
objects such as the earth or the universe (Leal & Shipley, 
1992:35). Nevertheless for most people the way in which 
material objects exist, is the paradigm for deciding whether 
something exists (is real) or not.  For Descartes, the world 
consists of two different kinds of substances: res cogitans 
and res extensa. The latter is “...the normal Aristotelian kind, 
the material object”, whilst the former is “...consciousness or 
mind – in Kant’s celebrated phrase, “this I or he (or she) or it 
which thinks” (Leal & Shipley 1992, p. 35). This 
transcendental self
6
 is what people often refer to as their 
‘fundamental “me”’, their ‘core’, their ‘I’, the ‘whatever-it-is 
that makes them the person they are’. 
Leal and Shipley point out that of the two substances, the 
mind is regarded as privileged over the body, in the sense 
that “...self-knowledge of the mind is superior and 
indubitable (in fact incorrigible), whereas knowledge of the 
body (by the mind) is hypothetical, uncertain and derivative” 
(Leal & Shipley 1992, p. 42 footnote 16), or, put differently, 
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 ‘Transcendental’ for Immanuel Kant means 
‘the-condition-of the-possibility-of’ of having this or that kind 
of experience. For example, without ‘time’ and ‘space’ I could 
not do any mathematical sum. See: Der transzendentalen 
Aesthetik. In I. Kant, Kritik Der Reinen Vernunft (Critique of 
Pure Reason), pp. 66-94. 
contemplative life is superior to active life. Many people, 
sometimes unknowingly, are Cartesian dualists. Leal and 
Shipley offer, by way of a psychological explanation, the 
tendency in human beings to “...make an unbreachable gap 
between themselves and everything else, particularly other 
people; in abstract, and somewhat psychoanalytic, language, 
a split between self and not self” (Leal & Shipley 1992, p. 34). 
Lakoff and Johnson explain the need for such a split by 
referring to what they describe as one of human beings’ basis 
instincts: territoriality. They explain: 
We are physical beings, bounded and 
set off from the rest of the world by the 
surface of our skins, and we experience 
the rest of the world as outside us. Each 
of us is a container with a bounding 
surface, an in-out orientation. We 
project our own in-out orientation onto 
other physical objects...[but we 
also]...impose this orientation on our 
natural environment (Lakoff & Johnson 
1980, p. 29). 
This urge to divide the world up into the mental and the 
physical is ‘metaphysical’ as “...it involves a method of 
knowing about the world prior to and untouchable by 
empirical science” (Rorty 1980, p. 18). This “deep dualism”
7
 
(Leal & Shipley 1992, p. 34) that influences how we think, is 
not a mere harmless theoretical stance, but has practical 
consequences for how we act and treat people and regard 
knowledge. Descartes’ famous dictum ‘I think, therefore I 
am’ (cogito ergo sum) constructed a particular subjectivity in 
Western thought: “a subject that constitutes and defines 
itself through its own constructive activity” (Dahlberg 2003, 
p. 264). Influenced  by Taylor, Dahlberg argues that “in 
modernity the autonomous and self-conscious subject has 
been the locus of certainty and truth and the first principle 
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 Leal and Shipley call it deep dualism, first because it has 
such a “profound grip on us”, but also, they claim, because 
it underlies all other dualisms (Leal & Shipley, 1992, p. 35). 




from which everything arises and to which all must be 
returned” (Dahlberg: 2003:264).  
Non-dualist responses 
Postmodernism is a critical response to the notion of the 
individual, logo-centric subject influenced in particular by 
Heidegger, and also Wittgenstein’s work The Philosophical 
Investigations (Murris, 1997)
8
. Both Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger reject virtually all dualistic vocabularies: subject 
and object, self and world, self and other, mind and body. 
Wittgenstein offers us a new theory of meaning, with 
far-reaching consequences for how we understand concepts. 
In Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) (1979), Heidegger forcefully 
shows how the metaphysical and epistemological tradition 
since Plato has infiltrated our everyday language and 
consciousness, and has resulted in the dualistic image we 
have of ourselves, other people, and our relation to the 
world. Peters describes how mind/body dualism has 
“developed as an instrument for ’othering’: of separating 
boys from girls, reason from emotion, minorities from the 
dominant culture, and classes from each other” (Peters 2004, 
p.  14). Although Wittgenstein acknowledges that we do have 
privileged access to our own thinking (e.g. I can keep my own 
feelings and thoughts secret), he denies the possible 
ontological implications – the mind as a substance, as res 
cogitans. We are the authority as far as knowing about our 
thoughts is concerned, but this authority is epistemological 
(about how we know) and not ontological (about the 
material that we know). Hence, the mind, or psyche are not 
separate entities in this world, although these concepts do 
have meaning in our language.  
Wittgenstein argued for an acknowledgment of the social 
component of our thinking. It is a community of 
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 Also, by the thinking of the American Pragmatists, but I 
have restricted myself here to two main thinkers only. 
language-users that teaches us the concepts we use in 
thinking, which gives language its meaning. Heidegger added 
the historical dimension (Rorty 1980, p.12): we have to 
distance ourselves from a language that presupposes that 
people can be ‘carved up’ into those separate entities ‘body’ 
and ‘mind’. People are understood as thinking, whole 
persons, being already in the world, and not thinking about 
the world. We should not dichotomise the thinker, and what 
the thinker is thinking about, as if they were separate 
ontological entities. Both Wittgenstein and Heidegger 
initiated the linguistic turn characteristic of contemporary 
thought.  The knowing subject does not have ‘direct’ access 
to the world it is thinking about or studying; understanding is 
always mediated  by the languages (including mathematical 
and scientific symbolic languages) used in constructing 
knowledge.  
For example, returning to the concept ‘substance’, this 
notion may be linguistically useful, but it does not inform us 
about what things are like in ‘the world’, or, as Russell puts it:   
‘Substance’, in one word, is a 
metaphysical mistake due to the 
transference to the world’s structure of 
the structure of sentences, composed of 
a subject and predicate (Russell 1970, 
pp. 196-7). 
What he is saying is that, for example, the structure of the 
sentence “My mind is blank” makes us believe that there is 
this thing (mind) in the world that has a quality (blankness), 
and that this quality exists apart from the substance (mind). 
Wittgenstein would agree: we call some mental state ‘hope’, 
‘love’, ‘expectation’, ‘feeling’ or ‘thought’,  not because of 
some essence,  but  because of the context in which it is 
used. It is the context that gives words and concepts their 
meaning: “A smiling mouth smiles only in a human face”
9 
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Teaching Thinking  
Highly relevant for the teaching of thinking is the context in 
which the concept ‘thinking’ is used in human practices or 
‘way of life’ (Wittgenstein, 1971). ‘Thinking’ cannot be 
defined, since asking the question, “what does it mean to 
think?” can only be answered by thinking (Heidegger 1968, p.  
xii). We are thinking. Not this subject (mind) ‘imprisoned’ in 
this object (body) is thinking about the world, but we are 
always already “there”, that is, in the world. “Dasein”, 
translated as “Being-there” ‘replaces’ the subject (mind) 
(Heidegger 1979, par. 2). Since Dasein is always thinking 
about its own thinking – an activity rather than a thing – it 
cannot take a detached (subject-object) view of itself (that 
would mean regarding itself as a thing). It is for this reason 
that thinking does not need external justification: it is not a 
means to other ends. Thinking is always underway 
(unterwegs). It is for this reason that Heidegger believes the 
teacher-student relationship should be like that between 
master and apprentice in the medieval guilds – to let 
“learning occur” (Heidegger 1968, p. vi). Todd critiques 
Heidegger’s individualist notion of Dasein. She highlights 
the implications of Heidegger’s own notion of Mitsein for 
human subjectivity: ‘being-in-the-world-with-others’ as 
part of the human existential condition.  Drawing on 
Hannah Arendt, Todd writes: “We are born into an already 
populated realm through which action and speech are 
founded (‘natality’) and therefore existence cannot be 
abstracted from co-existence” (Todd 2010). Individuals are 
unique through human relationships, through the space in-
between people.  It is through the events of speaking and 
                                                                                       
Philosophische Untersuchungen. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971, par. 583. It does not mean, however, 
that Wittgenstein adopts a behaviourist point of view. 
Wittgenstein argues that behaviourism itself is a 
metaphysical position. First of all, the behaviourist accepts 
the Cartesian mind/body dualism, rejects mind as being real, 
and is then left with human behaviour.  
acting that uniqueness emerges. Uniqueness is contextual, 
specific and embodied (Todd 2010). Humans always already 
find themselves ‘in’ time and space, and therefore they bring 
to any meaning-making processes their own prejudices and 
socially, culturally and historically situated understandings. 
What is crucial for teaching and learning is that the ‘in’, in 
‘being-in-time’ and ‘being-in-space’, is not understood  in a 
psychological sense, but in an ontological sense. 
Psychological methods tend to rely on individuals accessing 
their experiences with the help of the senses and/or 
introspection. The profound contribution Heidegger has 
made to the history of ideas and the development of post-
modern thought is the radical idea that bodily existence 
(being) and not the individual (beings) is ontologically prior, 
that is, individuals always already find themselves 
surrounded by beings (including others). This shift in thinking 
has made the development of, for example, 
(post)structuralist, constructivist and other non-dualist 
relational pedagogies possible. 
So how should we teach thinking, if thinking is an event 
between people, an activity and not a thing, and therefore 
cannot become an object for either scientific study (e.g. to 
be broken down into skills), or philosophical speculation 
(e.g. to determine its ‘essence’)? As I have argued, to 
regard thinking as an object of study would assume the 
possibility of taking a spectator view of thinking; as if 
humans were able to think about thinking from the 
‘outside’ as it were (the spaghetti is infinite). Gert Biesta 
reiterates the epistemological impossibility of humans 
being the source of all knowledge and at the same time 
the object of that knowledge (Biesta 2006, p. 4). What is 
being proposed is a nomadic subject: a subject that is 
embodied, and whose essence depends on its existence with 
others (through bodily interaction and communicative 
relationships). 




Thinking is an experience, an activity, that happens in the 
space between people who are bodies, who do not just 
have bodies. This importantly includes the emotions – 
‘even’ in the teaching of thinking. Emotions are not fixed 
entities, or feelings ‘inside’ our ‘selves’ that need to be 
managed or controlled, but are complex judgments, as 
linguistic concepts.  Emotions are often intelligent 
responses to dynamic social relationships; they alert us to 
the moral dimension of our existence (Murris 2009). Such 
a take requires an abandonment of the still popular 
Platonic conception of emotions as inner, private, mental 
states. An essentialist, psychological understanding of 
emotions strips the individual subject from its context.  
The linguistic turn has turned us all into epistemological 
orphans. The idea of certain knowledge has become 
problematic with the abandonment of all subject/object 
dualisms, which is the condition of the possibility of a 
correspondence theory of truth – the idea that knowledge 
is infallible and transmittable, and that emotions can be 
mastered.  
It is often wrongly claimed that postmodernism implies 
epistemological relativism. It is indeed true that 
knowledge is always situated in time and space, so there is 
no view from ‘nowhere’. It is also true that views are 
always from ‘somewhere’ (the entangled strings of 
spaghetti are infinite, so we cannot have a whole view), 
but it does not follow that there is no view at all, or, that 
all views are equally valid. Knowledge acquisition is not 
about looking for beginnings and endings, but the action, 
the activity of putting a fork in the spaghetti and gradually 
moving outwards
10
.    
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University of Witwatersrand for coming up with this idea.  
The role of academic texts 
Philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer’s groundbreaking work 
Truth and Method (1975) is a powerful challenge to the idea 
that academic texts can be interpreted objectively and from 
a certain, external, secure vantage point by an educator. The 
process of making sense of a text always involves a “fusion of 
the contexts of both interpreter and text” and requires a 
“relationship of vulnerability to the text” and an attempt to 
be ‘fully open’ in the conversation between reader and text 
(Dunne 1993, p. 105; p. 115). Gadamer’s ‘hermeneutics’ 
implies that meanings are not already contained ‘in’ the text, 
but “the meaning of the text has its being in the 
conversations in which it is brought into partnership”. A text, 
Joseph Dunne, continues: 
…is always released into a semantic field, beyond 
the reach of its author, and is charged with 
possibilities of meaning that become actual only in 
virtue of movements in the rest of the field. It is 
the dynamism of history itself that constitutes this 
field and within it there is the meaning of the text. 
It is in this sense that Gadamer speaks of time (i.e. 
the time elapsed between the production of a text 
and its subsequent interpretation) not as a “gulf” 
but as a “supportive ground” (Dunne 1993, p. 118).    
Influenced by Heidegger, Gadamer regards hermeneutics 
as the most fundamental, pre-scientific mode of being-in-
the-world. Understanding a text is not the outcome of 
critical, propositional thinking processes, but includes a 
pre-reflective, pragmatic know-how that reveals itself 




Teaching practice can have an ‘open texture’ (Dunne 1993, 
p. 379) and be a ‘hands-on’ encounter, if we allow 
students to make connections collaboratively between 
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their prior knowledge and experiences when making sense 
of academic texts. From an American pragmatist 
perspective, Brinkmann and Tanggaard argue that ideas 
are tools for the embodied knower to transform, engage 
with and cope with the world. Truth, they say, is not 
correspondence with an ‘external’ reality and knowledge a 
representation of the world as-it-is, but a tool for 
manipulating and handling the world for human purposes. 
(Brinkmann & Tanggaard 2009, pp. 243-4; p. 253). One 
moment in our experience leads to another and then to 
another, ad infinitum, like endless strings of spaghetti.  
By drawing on their own lived experiences, students can 
make connections to help fit parts of a text into meaningful, 
coherent wholes (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, pp. 172-175). 
Kieran Egan, for example, argues how the body helps 
mediate abstract concepts such as ‘cold’ and ‘hot’. The 
initial discriminations of temperature as ‘hotter’ or ’colder’ 
than one’s own body temperature, helps a learner 
understand the mediating concept ‘warm’ (Egan, 1995, p.  
120).  Many scientific concepts have lost the original 
connection between language and embodiment (Levering 
2006, pp. 455-6; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Johnson, 2007). 
For students to have the opportunity to ask their own 
questions in tuts helps them make their own meaningful 
connections through the event of thinking with others. The 
past is always active in reading an academic text in the 
present, even when humans are not conscious of this fact. 
Readers bring their own historicity and temporality to their 
interpretations of any resource used in teaching. . 
There are many factors that influence such encounters 
between students and tutors: the context of the 
environment in which the teaching takes place: the walls, the 
furniture in the room, the weather, the presence of other 
bodies in the room; their scent, their size, their clothing. The 
expressions on their faces, what these bodies say, what they 
do, how they listen. We get to know, not only the texts 
better, but also ourselves through such relationships with 
others and our environment. Nussbaum reminds us that a 
“large part of learning takes place in the experience of the 
concrete” (Nussbaum 1990, p. 44). Todd argues that 
transformation is a “pedagogical act”. She writes: 
“pedagogy, like the motherless boy, is founded on a 
second birth – one that is bound up with the relational 
aspects of being present in context with others (Todd 
2010). Our presence in the world as educators is always an 
engagement with a particular context and this includes 
connecting with our own bodies and those of our students 
in the room.  
The various metaphors I have used in this paper challenge 
how we think about teaching, the norms we use to 
evaluate our educational practices and how we use 
academic texts in Higher Education. But is playing with 
spaghetti through the use of the body indeed a “childish” 
activity? Mad Hatter’s
12
, for short, is indeed playful, but 
would it be fair to say that it is also “childish” – the sort of 
activity that does not belong in academia? Am I wasting 
their time? Am I doing my students a disservice by not 
preparing them properly for the reading of academic 
texts?  I would like to resist the either/or implications of 
the latter question, and suggest that I intend (and 
hopefully succeed) to do both. That is, the pedagogical 
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 The Mad Hatter’s Tea Party is only one strategy I 
sometimes use when I judge it to be helpful to explore a 
range of questions. I often make those professional 
judgments at the spur of the moment as, for example, at a 
school in-service training in Johannesburg in February 
2010. The data-projector stopped working and I asked all 
70 staff to take their chairs outside in the garden and 
construct 2 rows opposite each other. As it happened it 
allowed a very useful time for teachers to explore 
questions they had generated earlier that day, at the same 
time allowing the technicians to fix the audio-visual 
equipment.   




processes I engage my students in, helps them access 
academic texts. In academic writing, academics put 
arguments forward, respond, and more or less successfully 
build on each other’s ideas. Albeit static and ‘stretched out 
in time’ the structure resembles that of an infinite 
dialogical tangle of spaghetti. Means and ends are 
intricately interwoven. The inter-connectedness of having 
intelligent conversations (Wegerif 2002) and philosophical 
thinking is largely ignored in the teaching of philosophy. 
However, philosophy is dialogue – with oneself, with 
others, with text books, philosophical writings, or visual 
images. As John Locke has pointed out: teaching children 
how to reason is best achieved by engagement in practices 
that call for reasoning behaviour rather than teaching 
particular rules or procedures (Locke 1978). Involving 
students in embodied verbal reasoning practices requires 
an approach to education which is tolerant and responsive 
to differences of opinion. This necessitates not only a 
different approach to the content of the university 
curriculum and the way teacher education institutions are 
organised, but also how it nurtures good quality 
teaching
13
. The lecturer cannot be all-knowing and 
infallible (Bottery 1990, pp. 238-239). Also, a shift in 
teachers’ attitude is necessary which would be an 
expression of a different kind of “attitude to epistemology 
in general, one which is aware of its tentativeness and 
changeable nature, is tolerant of criticism, is open-minded, 
and aware of its fallibility” (Bottery 1990, p. 238). Russell 
urges us “to keep alive that speculative interest in the 
universe which is apt to be killed by confining ourselves to 
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 For example, at the School of Education at the 
University of the Witwatersrand, pressure on staff to do 
research and publish is similar to that of other 
departments within the Faculty of Humanities. No 
allowances are made for the fact that, unlike other 
departments, a teacher education institution has the extra 
responsibility of modelling good quality teaching practices.    
definitely ascertainable knowledge” (Russell 1982, pp. 89-
91).  
Childlike, not childish 
Play is what children do, not because they are in a 
state of innocence, but because they are 
perpetually learning, perpetually becoming… 
(Lewis 2001, p. 81). 
What counts as ‘child’ is philosophically problematic 
(Matthews, 1994) and normative in that it applies to “a 
period of developmental preparation both for adulthood 
as it now is, and for an ideal adulthood that has not yet 
been realized” (Friquegnon 1997, p.12). Friquegnon argues 
how authoritarian education, based on the apprenticeship 
model of education, values children as inadequate adults 
and requires punitive training to extinguish childishness 
and to ensure that a child is ‘adultlike’ as soon as possible.  
As “a mutually necessary contrastive pair”, ‘child’ is 
unthinkable without ‘adult’ and vice versa (Kennedy 2000, 
pp. 215-6). Whatever we say about ‘child’ also implies 
judgments about ‘adult’. Matthews argues that, for 
example, the universalising tendency of Western 
developmental psychology encourages educators to 
‘distance’ themselves – “both from the children around us 
and from our own childhood selves” (Matthews, 1994:66). 
Such distancing often leads to “condescension”, which 
Matthews argues is “morally offensive”. Matthews 
suggests that to engage with individual children as 
rational, active, collaborative participants in knowledge 
construction as their “simple directness”, often “bring us 
back to basics” (Matthews 1994, p. 67). Generalising about 
children’s abilities fails to do justice to the capacities of 
individual children (Murris 1997).    
Only since the start of liberal education has an 
appreciation developed for the intrinsic childlike qualities 
of childhood in the West (Friquegnon 1997, pp. 13-14) 




such as openness, curiosity, playfulness, enthusiasm, 
honesty, embodied meaning-making and trust. Adults who 
display such qualities are often praised as being childlike, 
in contrast to the pejoratively used ‘childish’ adults 
(Friquegnon 1997, p. 14). Friquegnon argues that the 
common confusion between ‘childlike’ and ‘childish’ has 
meant that the former is often regarded as incompatible 
with adult responsibility (as e.g. in much child-centered 
education inspired by Rousseau).  
In the Middle Ages, on the other hand, there was no 
distinction between ‘childish’ and ‘childlike’: adults and 
children played the same games and equally engaged with 
myths, fairy-tales, magic and miracles (Friquegnon 1998, p. 
2). Literature specifically for children developed much 
later. In traditional African societies there is also no 
distinction between work and play and childhood is not 
necessarily viewed as a stage of incompetence. Viewing 
children as capable has much to do with living at 
subsistence level when taking up ‘adult responsibilities’ 
starts early (including participating in warfare) (Twum-
Danso 2005, pp. 12-13). Although childhood has been 
understood in different ways across cultures and different 
historical periods, Archard argues that it would be a 
simplification to conclude that childhood is a social 
construction. Influenced by Rawls, he makes a helpful 
distinction between concept and conception (Archard 
2004, pp. 27-31). The concept of childhood is necessarily 
linked to that of adulthood: childhood as the absence of 
adulthood. It is also necessarily linked to age – “children 
are young human beings” (Archard 2004, p. 29). 
Increasingly educators argue that the ‘passage’ from child 
to adult comes at a price: a gradual demise of imaginative, 
metaphorical, embodied and original thinking, so 
characteristic of young children (see e.g. Egan, 1992, 1993, 
1997).  
To what extent this demise is seen as a loss depends on 
one’s conception of childhood. So, all societies have a 
concept of childhood (and is therefore not just a social 
construction), but their conceptions differ (Archard 2004, 
p. 28).  Childhood is also a biological phenomenon, but 
biology not understood as a set of facts, immutable across 
time and space. They are not merely brute facts of the 
given, but “represent the claims of particular scientific 
discourses” and “social, political, geographical, and 
economical factors have caused the construction of 
‘immaturity’, i.e., “a child’s physical nature relative to 
adults” (Archard, 2004, p. 26). So, all societies have a 
concept of childhood, but their conceptions differ, 
according to the extent (when does it finish?), its nature 
(what exactly constitutes the difference between child and 
adult?), and the significance adults attach to these 
differences (Archard 2004, p. 31; Matthews, 1994).   
Different conceptions of childhood reveal the physical and 
metaphysical assumptions humans attach to ‘child’, and 
inform the distinction generally made between ‘childish’ 
and ‘childlike’. Developmental theories are an expression 
of an “abstract disembodied psychological subject” with 
the individual child abstracted from its social context 
(Burman 2008a, p. 294).  Such essentialising of child is 
characteristic of developmental theories that equate the 
history of the individual with the history of mankind. These 
normative recapitulation theories (Matthews, 1994) 
assume that the ‘progress’ civilisations have made from 
oral, irrational, mythical, embodied knowledge to written, 
rational, detached, abstract, disembodied knowledge is 
reflected in the maturational process of a child becoming 
an adult. Burman argues that Western sentimentalised 
representations of children as immature, innocent, 
unknowing, helpless and in need of protection are 
attempts to deny children agency, and perpetuates the 
false belief that young people cannot be responsible, 




active, co-constructors of knowledge (Burman 2008a, p. 
293).  
What this brief analysis of the various conceptions of 
childhood shows is the hidden subjectivity of claims to 
‘adultlike’ knowledge, as asocial, rational (in a 
disembodied manner), so deeply dualistic in the Cartesian 
sense. Not only ‘the’ child is essentialised, but by the same 
token ‘the’ adult. Allowing oneself to be also ‘childlike’ 
involves engaging with a conception of rationality that 
does not sever thought from action, emotion from the 
intellect, form from content or the abstract from the 
concrete. For teaching and learning it implies a relational 
approach that emphasises an attentiveness to the 
presence of the bodies in a classroom, bodies without 
‘insides’ and ‘outsides’ but engaged in lived experiences. 
Being-in-the-present with students requires a tentative 
openness to the thinking of the Other through verbal and 
bodily communication, such as the movement of hands, 
expressions of anger or confusion, collaborative reflection, 
negotiation and responsive listening.  Furthermore, it 
requires the educator to draw on other particular childlike 
qualities, such as the use of imagination, metaphors, being 
curious, having a sense of fun in order to be fully human. 
Metaphors, Bruner contends, are “the crutches to help us 
get up the abstract mountain” and as soon as we are ‘up’ 
we hide the crutches or throw them away by replacing them 
for formal, logically consistent theories expressed preferably 
in mathematical terms (Bruner 1986, p. 48).  In the process 
we remain unaware of the reductionist assumptions that 
result from this ‘forgetfulness’ of the history of how language 
grows through metaphors. We have forgotten that: 
Abstract words are ancient coins whose concrete 
images in the busy give-and-take of talk have worn 
away with use (Jaynes 1990, p. 51). 
Connecting with the lived experiences of our students, 
making room for playing with spaghetti and metaphors is 
central to making academic texts meaningful. Instead of 
treating these texts as units of information, and 
demanding from students that they regurgitate ‘the’ 
meaning or essence of them in assignments and exams, 
the role of embodiment has implications for how we view 
teaching and learning. What an academic text means 
includes pre-verbal and lived experiences, not merely what 
can be understood intellectually. Reasoning about such 
texts collaboratively is a situated embodied human 
practice, which is neither a universal, nor a necessary, 
mechanical application of logical rules (Burbules 1995, pp. 
85-88). ‘Scaffolding’ takes on a different meaning and 
requires making room for students’ own understandings, 
their bodies, and a creative use and self-reflective critical 
stance towards the metaphors we use as lecturers when 
justifying our teaching practices.  
Implications for transformation in the South African 
context  
The 1994 elections announced the birth of a new 
democracy in South Africa and the death of the apartheid 
regime. This political shift had dramatic implications for 
the transformation of education from an authoritarian 
system focusing on the reproduction of fixed knowledge 
for the privileged few (mainly white) learners, to an 
educational system that in principle included all children, 
with a contextualised constructivist approach to 
knowledge as laid down in Curriculum 2005 (Green 2000). 
The historical inequities in South Africa were so extreme, 
which may explain (in contrast to other white-settler 
countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, USA, Canada) 
the current passionate academic debate in teacher 
training institutions on “the purity of knowledge-domains” 
or academic “gate-keeping” (Michelson 2004, p. 26, 
footnote 8). The constructivist project is seen as a 




“breakdown between boundaries” between academic and 
local (prior) knowledge resulting in “promiscuous 
combinations of abstract and concrete thought” 
(Michelson 2004, p. 8; p. 23). Osman argues for a space at 
university that includes and explores “new forms of 
scholarship about knowing through experience and 
knowing through action” (Osman 2004, p. 312). 
Importantly, she emphasises understanding the value of 
informal, prior knowledge for its own sake, rather than 
measured against academic knowledge (Osman 2004, p. 
306). For widening access to academia to include students 
from more ‘underprivileged’ backgrounds, the post-dualist 
view that knowledge is “a process that weaves the private 
and public lives of human beings into integrated and 
whole realities” (Osman 2004, p. 306) is an exciting 
promise.  
Todd argues that educational theory has been quite 
consumed with the socialising and reproductive function 
of education as ‘formation’ – a shaping of children for the 
future. For trans/formation, however, she proposes 
shifting the focus to “who they are in the present…. 
despite whether or not this alteration leads to the 
formation we desire” (Todd 2010). With a focus on process 
and relational exchanges, she argues that “pedagogy 
enables us to think about how our becoming someone is 
necessarily transformative”. Embodied relational 
pedagogy makes room for relating to students as 
competent resourceful creative Others who enrich the 
educational experience, blurring dichotomies between the 
educator and the educated. The focus of teaching turns to 
the space in between people. Derrida urges educators to 
engage with and take responsibility for a future still to 
come - teaching that “interrupts the philosophical 
tradition of making ourselves as the master over the child” 
(Dahlberg 2003, p. 273).  
 
A wealth of contemporary cross-disciplinary literature (see 
e.g. Burman 2008a,b; Valencia, 2010) is an urgent call for 
deconstruction of some commonly held beliefs about our 
students who apparently ‘lack’ skills, have ‘needs’, are 
‘lazy’, ‘incompetent’, ‘immature’, ‘impoverished’ or 
‘disadvantaged’. As these assumptions about our students 
are reflections of how children are often regarded and 
treated at schools, rupturing such modernist habits of 
thoughts at university is urgent and essential. Sites such as 
initial teacher education should model educators listening 
in a radically open way, offering opportunities for 
enjoyable mutually enriching dialogue and exchanges of 
experiences. The dichotomies that continue to inform 
pedagogical choices in education feed ‘deficit thinking’. 
Valencia explains that one of the six characteristics of 
deficit thinking is “a person-centred explanation of school 
failure among individuals as linked to group membership 
(typically, the combination of racial minority status and 
economic disadvantagement)” (Valencia 2010, p. 18).   
Focusing on the so-called ‘internal’ deficits or deficiencies 
of the students obscures and distracts educators from 
taking moral responsibility. The ‘otherisation’ of our 
students prevents us from critically reflecting on our own 
pedagogical practices, and tends to exclude students who 
are most unlike ourselves. The alternative, dialogical 
engagement with and between embodied selves must be 
pursued with a sensitive political will on the part of 
educators: through relinquishing authority and unlearning 
assumptions routinely made about students; and through 
explicit attention to relational pedagogy and 
communication at university. Students’ own questions 
should drive and motivate the learning process as, for 
example, is the case in the Mad Hatter’s Tea Party strategy 
outlined at the beginning of this paper.  
 
 




Mad Hatter’s Tea Party 
Who asks the questions in class is a profound political 
question (see Haynes & Murris, 2012).The use of the body 
in the Mad Hatter’s activity is deliberate. The knees of the 
students almost touch and room is made to engage with 
the person sitting opposite, away from a plenary gaze. 
Their thinking changes and deepens through their 
experience of the presence of the Other: the movement of 
the hands, their skin, their smiles, their energy, the words 
that come out of their mouths, their silences. Current 
changes in learning and teaching practices, technologies and 
theories reflect a change to embrace other means of 
meaning making that include the visual, the aesthetic and 
the kinaesthetic (Johnson 1987, 2007). The thinking body is 
also a feeling body. Who we are, where we live and what we 
feel, affect our reasoning processes. Our body is not only an 
object of knowledge, but also a knowing, sentient being 
(Burkitt 1999, p. 61). The body and its location is significant 
for how knowledge is constructed. Meaning and 
understanding is constructed through social and 
interpersonal engagement. This contrasts starkly with the 
Cartesian view referred to at the beginning of this paper.  
Mad Hatter’s can be used with large groups. I sometimes 
use the space in the corridor or outside. The kinaesthetic 
dimension enables students to explore ideas and learn 
from a large variety of others in a relatively short space of 
time. The activity is meaningful, because the students are 
given the opportunity to locate the new knowledge from 
the text and the lecture in a framework which is connected 
to something in their own lived experience, something 
which already makes sense to them (Splitter & Sharp 1995, 
p. 68). Only after students have had the opportunity to 
construct their own answers to the set task (Is this 
question philosophical or not?), each question is discussed 
and feedback invited from the students. The teacher 
facilitates the process and guides the activity, but resists 
intervening in the content initially. Content knowledge is 
not sacrificed, but used by the teacher by imaginatively 
connecting with the ideas put forward by the students, 
and by weaving in new ideas, offering other perspectives, 
or linking students’ contributions. Strings of spaghetti are 
re-structured. It is the differences between the people in 
the room that provide such rich educational opportunities. 
Diversity and difference are not intimidating barriers, but 
enrich the learning process. As Burbules and Rice argue, 
respect across differences can be developed only when 
mirrored in the pedagogy, because: 
We learn by making connections 
between what we know and what is 
new to us: this cognitive process is 
paralleled and fostered 
developmentally, by the 
communicative relations in which we 
are engaged from a very early age 
(Burbules & Rice 1991, pp. 412-413).  
Students find it considerably easier to voice their own 
points of view after they have been given the opportunity 
to bounce off ideas with peers on a 1:1 basis. Critical and 
creative discussions naturally emerge if the teacher allows 
herself to be surprised and moved by the thinking and 
being of the others. For transformation, the inclusion of 
relational pedagogies is especially urgent in Higher 
Education institutions that prepare future teachers, as 
their own practices are likely to be replicated in future 
classrooms.  
Accepting the human ‘condition’ as that of an 
epistemological orphan involves a fresh re-thinking of the 
role of embodiment, the relationship between thinking 
and talking (the importance of oracy or verbal reasoning) 
and what it means to think about thinking (including the 
idea what philosophy is). If thinkers are (also) bodies, the 
use of kinaesthetic activities is not a random pedagogical 
decision that may or may not help engage students, but 




offers opportunities for thinkers to experience first-hand 
the presence of the other.   
A more embodied view of what ‘thinking’ is, changes how 
lecturers regard their own role as facilitators of learning, 
how they plan their lessons, what strategies they use and 
what they regard as the ‘products’ of their teaching. At a 
deep level it raises the question of what it means to 
prepare one’s lessons and how the otherness of the 
student is incorporated in one’s teaching. It involves a 
rejection of several practices of modern education: 
separating our students by seating them in rows, regarding 
books and papers as the main transmitters of knowledge 
with lecturers having privileged access, and the giving of 
definitions as expressions of understanding concepts.  
This paper has argued that for transformation a 
deconstruction of the core Cartesian dualism between the 
knowing subject and the object is urgent as it has shaped 
other dichotomies between skills/content, 
cognition/emotion, how/what, process/content, 
public/private knowledge, teacher/learner, and 
importantly adult/child. Transformation at a deep level is 
possible only when in teaching thinking we allow ‘childlike’ 
play with spaghetti and acknowledge the pedagogical 
implications of reason’s ‘contamination’ by the particular, 
the anecdotal, the contextual and the emotions. Thinkers 
do not ‘have’, but ‘are’ bodies, and this perspective 
influences pedagogical decisions, making learning more 
inclusive and meaningful especially for students from 
more ‘underprivileged’ backgrounds who struggle to 
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